A company that started in 1993 with 3D chips for games became, in 33 years, an empire that commands AI computing. Read its filings, and what built it turns out to be less the foresight so often credited to it than two things: continuing to put CUDA on every GPU, and waves of demand that surged in from outside. In November 2026, with its founder gone, the weight of what has held the empire up is being questioned anew.
The company that began in a Denny’s booth in 1993 stumbled with the NV1, a bet on its own approach, went through a contract with Sega, and got back on its feet with the RIVA 128, built without a prototype. Through the filings of the day, we follow it past the “GPU” label, the strings of the Xbox deal, an SEC order and a slide to 21%, up to 2006, when AMD bought ATI.
In 2006, two weeks after AMD closed its purchase of ATI, NVIDIA announced CUDA. The people who showed what GPUs could do for deep learning were university researchers, and what they used was the GeForce, a card made for games. This is the decade from CUDA to cuDNN, and on to Huang’s “horse to ride.”
In 2016, Jensen Huang delivered the first DGX-1 to OpenAI. Over the six years that followed, what rocked NVIDIA’s revenue was cryptocurrency mining. We trace the two waves, the “punch in the gut” of the 2019 letter to shareholders, the SEC’s 2022 order, and the road past the Merge to ChatGPT.
In May 2023, NVIDIA put out a revenue outlook of $11.0 billion for the next quarter. From the generational handoffs that ran from the Tensor Core to Blackwell and Rubin, to Mellanox’s networking, the Arm deal that never closed, the CUDA moat that shows up in competitors’ filings, and the warrants AMD attached to deals with its biggest customers, we read from the filings what a company that reached a $5 trillion market value stands on.
In August 2022, a single notice from the U.S. government put NVIDIA’s GPUs on the front line of export controls. We follow the chase between rules and products that ran through the A800, the H800 and the H20, the investigation by China’s SAMR, the change in how geographic revenue is counted, and the reporting on Megaspeed, a company in Singapore.
From the reports of late October 2026 to the November 12 announcement of the resignation and Congress’s second letter. In the order things happened, we set out what the reports said and on what basis, and what the official record of the board, of Huang himself, of governments and of Congress showed. The company has not given a reason for the resignation.