August 2016, San Francisco. Jensen Huang delivered a single computer to an artificial intelligence (AI) research lab. It was the "DGX-1," which the company had unveiled only that April at its own event (GTC 2016), and NVIDIA's official blog called it the "world's first AI supercomputer in a box."

The recipient was OpenAI. According to that blog post, dated August 15, 2016 (now readable only in an archive), Huang said:

"I thought it was incredibly appropriate that the world's first supercomputer dedicated to artificial intelligence would go to the laboratory that was dedicated to open artificial intelligence."

The DGX-1 carried the new "Tesla P100" GPU and came with "NVLink," a high-speed interconnect linking GPUs, and "cuDNN," a deep learning library. According to the launch materials, it delivered up to 170 teraflops at half precision (FP16) and the throughput of 250 x86 servers, all packed into a single box. According to the blog, Huang explained that building the DGX-1 took 3,000 people working for three years, and went on:

"So if this is the only one ever shipped, this project would cost $2 billion."

The U.S. business magazine Fortune (August 15, 2016) reported that NVIDIA said it had "donated" the supercomputer to OpenAI. According to the magazine, Huang wrote "To Elon and the OpenAI Team!" on the machine's body, adding, "To the future of computing and humanity. I present you the world's first DGX-1!" The magazine also quotes a tweet in which Elon Musk expressed his thanks.

The blog also preserves the words of OpenAI's researchers. Ilya Sutskever, one of the three who had published an image-recognition paper at the University of Toronto four years earlier (describing the network later known as "AlexNet"), said:

"Our advances depend on GPUs being fast. Speed of our computers is, in some sense, the lifeblood of deep learning."

The researcher Andrej Karpathy took conversation data on the internet as his example:

"You can take a large amount of data that would help people talk to each other on the internet, and you can train, basically, a chatbot, but you can do it in a way that the computer learns how language works and how people interact." "One very easy way of always getting our models to work better is to just scale the amount of compute."

Read today, these are words that call to mind the conversational AI that came later.

The company's numbers, though, still wore a different face. In its annual report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 2016, NVIDIA broke out "Data Center" revenue as a separate line for the first time. It came to $339 million, 6.8% of total revenue of $5.01 billion. Even in the fiscal year ended January 2017, when DGX-1 shipments began, it was $830 million, or 12.0%. For roughly the six years that followed, what rocked NVIDIA's revenue hardest, leaving behind both profits and wounds, was not yet AI but crypto-asset (cryptocurrency) mining.


The word "bitcoin" never appeared in a single filing

The first wave in which GPUs were put to work mining crypto assets came with bitcoin. Mining bitcoin means repeating a hash calculation called SHA-256 over and over. The community-edited "Bitcoin Wiki" explains that GPUs, with their large numbers of simple arithmetic logic units (ALUs), can execute far more instructions than CPUs in this repetitive work.

The same wiki gives two reasons why AMD's GPUs were faster than NVIDIA's at this kind of mining. One is that AMD used a design that lined up many simple ALUs (VLIW), which the wiki says produces an "approximate 2x-3x performance difference." The other is that AMD's GPUs handled the 32-bit integer right rotate, which SHA-256 uses heavily, in one instruction, where NVIDIA's GPUs needed three. Taken together, the wiki says, the two make AMD's GPUs 3 to 5 times faster at mining bitcoin.

A full-text search of EDGAR, the electronic disclosure system of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for NVIDIA's filings from 2001 through 2023 turns up not a single instance of the word "bitcoin." Bitcoin mining would eventually be taken over by application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs).

The wind shifted in 2017.

According to the findings of an order the SEC issued later, beginning in NVIDIA's fiscal 2018 (February 2017 to January 2018), GPUs became popular for mining Ether (ETH) and other crypto assets. According to the same order, the price of ETH rose from under $10 on January 1, 2017, to nearly $800 on January 1, 2018.

On August 10, 2017, alongside its results for the second quarter (of fiscal 2018), NVIDIA filed a commentary by its chief financial officer (CFO) as an exhibit to a Form 8-K. As far as EDGAR's full-text search shows, this is the first document among NVIDIA's filings in which the word "cryptocurrency" appears.

"Our PC OEM revenue includes GPUs designed for mainstream desktops, notebooks, and cryptocurrency mining. The recent rise in crypto coin prices resulted in increased demand in OEM GPU sales."

In fiscal 2018, NVIDIA's revenue grew to $9.714 billion from $6.91 billion the year before. Gaming revenue also rose, from $4.06 billion to $5.513 billion. Revenue from cryptocurrency-specific products was $273 million in fiscal 2018 and $306 million in fiscal 2019 (according to the fiscal 2019 10-K).

Were the miners buying only the dedicated products? The SEC's later order found that "NVIDIA had information indicating that cryptomining was a significant factor in the year-over-year growth in revenue from the sale of GPUs that NVIDIA designed and marketed for gaming" (NVIDIA neither admitted nor denied this).

In the two quarterly reports (10-Q) filed on August 23 and November 21, 2017, cryptocurrency mining comes up only in the explanation of OEM revenue. The August 10-Q said the growth in Gaming had been led by the adoption of Pascal-generation GeForce GTX products. Cryptocurrency mining was added as a driver of Gaming growth in the fiscal 2018 10-K, filed on February 28, 2018.

What would remain once the mining demand left? The answer showed up in the results the following year, in the autumn of 2018.


"This quarter was a real punch in the gut"

Toward the middle of 2018, crypto demand thinned out abruptly.

The 10-Q for February–April 2018 still showed $289 million of GPUs for cryptocurrency mining included in OEM revenue. But according to the CFO commentary for the second quarter of fiscal 2019, released on August 16, 2018, the company had expected cryptocurrency-specific product revenue for the quarter of "approximately $100 million," while the actual figure was "$18 million." The commentary said that whereas the company had previously anticipated cryptocurrency to be meaningful for the year, it was now projecting no contribution going forward. The 10-Q filed the same day likewise expected the cryptocurrency-related revenue included in OEM to be "negligible going forward."

The problem was the inventory of Pascal-generation mid-range GPUs that had piled up in the distribution network (the channel).

On November 15, 2018, announcing third-quarter results, Huang said, "Our near-term results reflect excess channel inventory post the crypto-currency boom, which will be corrected." According to the CFO commentary, the company recorded $57 million in charges related to prior architecture components and chips following the sharp fall-off in cryptocurrency mining demand. The revenue outlook it gave at that point for the fourth quarter (late October 2018 to January 2019) was "$2.70 billion."

After the new year, on January 28, 2019, NVIDIA issued a press release (8-K) cutting its fourth-quarter revenue guidance by $500 million, from $2.70 billion to "$2.20 billion." According to the release, the mid-range inventory left after the crypto boom had come down largely in line with management's expectations. The reasons it gave for the lower guidance were deteriorating macroeconomic conditions, particularly in China; sales of certain high-end GPUs of the new Turing generation coming in below expectations; and a number of Data Center deals that did not close in the last month of the quarter.

On the same day, Huang put out a letter to shareholders, attached to an 8-K.

"It was a challenging quarter with several extraordinary dynamics."

The letter explained that the November guidance had already reflected the excess inventory of Pascal mid-range GPUs that resulted from the sharp decline in cryptocurrency demand. It said the company's view that the inventory would be largely depleted between February and April 2019 remained unchanged. It then said that during the fourth quarter the global economy had decelerated sharply, particularly in China, affecting consumer demand for gaming GPUs. The letter closed like this:

"This quarter was a real punch in the gut. But your company is resilient, creative, and repeatedly rises to great challenges. We will shake this off and come back strong."

In its fiscal 2019 10-K, filed in February 2019, NVIDIA wrote: "We believe demand for our desktop gaming GPU products used by end users for cryptocurrency mining and its after-effects have distorted trends in Gaming revenue." In the same passage, it also said it believed that deteriorating macroeconomic conditions, particularly in China, had impacted consumer demand for GeForce.

A regulator later delivered its judgment on the two 10-Qs from 2017.

On May 6, 2022, the SEC issued a cease-and-desist order against NVIDIA, and NVIDIA settled by paying a civil penalty of $5.5 million (Release No. 33-11060). NVIDIA consented to the order without admitting or denying its findings.

The order covered two 10-Qs, for the second and third quarters of fiscal 2018 (both in 2017). According to the order's findings, Gaming revenue in those two quarters rose 52% and 25%, respectively, from the same periods a year earlier. The order made the following findings about the situation inside the company at the time:

"Some of NVIDIA's sales personnel expressed their belief that much of the increased demand for the company's Gaming products, primarily in China, was being driven by cryptomining."

"NVIDIA's senior management internally expressed a desire to capture the cryptomining demand, and at the same time shelter its Gaming business from cryptominers and protect supply of GPUs for gamers."

The order also found that, as a result, NVIDIA launched a product line called "CMP," marketed to large cryptomining operations, and reported its sales within OEM in the 10-Qs (in the fiscal 2018 10-K they were called "Cryptocurrency-specific GPUs"). According to the order, the company could not track which Gaming GPUs were bought for mining, or when. The order then found that, by estimates company personnel made using various assumptions, the impact of mining was at a level that made it a significant factor in the growth of Gaming revenue.

On that basis, the order found that, by describing only the impact on OEM and leaving out the impact on Gaming, the 10-Qs "gave the misimpression … that the year-over-year growth in the company's Gaming revenue was not meaningfully impacted by cryptomining." Kristina Littman, chief of the SEC Enforcement Division's Crypto Assets and Cyber Unit, said in the announcement, "NVIDIA's disclosure failures deprived investors of critical information to evaluate the company's business in a key market."

The provisions the order found NVIDIA had violated were Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act; Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act, which requires quarterly reports to be filed accurately; and rules on disclosure controls, among others. The order states explicitly that a violation of Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) does not require scienter (intent) and may rest on a finding of negligence. The order contains no finding of scienter. NVIDIA's acceptance of the order without admitting or denying it took the same form as in 2003, when it received an order over its accounting.

The disclosures of this period also drew a securities class action from shareholders. According to NVIDIA's fiscal 2023 10-K, the plaintiff shareholders assert that the company and certain executives made false or misleading statements about channel inventory and the impact of cryptocurrency mining in 2017 and 2018. The U.S. Supreme Court granted NVIDIA's petition for review on June 17, 2024, and heard oral argument on November 13, but on December 11 it dismissed the writ "as improvidently granted," turning the appeal away without ruling on it.


The cat-and-mouse game of hash-rate limits (LHR), and "The Merge"

Mining demand turned toward GeForce once more. In a 10-Q filed in May 2021, NVIDIA wrote that it believed Gaming had benefited from cryptocurrency mining demand, although it was hard to determine to what extent.

This time, NVIDIA tried to separate gaming from mining on the product side.

On February 18, 2021, in an official blog post titled "GeForce Is Made for Gaming, CMP Is Made to Mine" (the original page now redirects to another page; the text can be checked in a repost), NVIDIA announced two moves at once.

One was that the drivers for the "GeForce RTX 3060," going on sale February 25, would detect specific attributes of the Ethereum mining algorithm and limit the hash rate, or mining efficiency, "by around 50 percent." The other was "CMP (Cryptocurrency Mining Processor)," a product line for professional mining operations. According to the blog, CMP doesn't do graphics, has no display outputs and doesn't meet the specifications of a GeForce GPU, so it would not affect the supply of GeForce to gamers.

On May 26 of the same year, NVIDIA announced that it would also reduce the Ethereum hash rate on newly manufactured RTX 3080, 3070 and 3060 Ti cards, which would carry a "Lite Hash Rate," or "LHR," identifier. According to the 10-Q for the second quarter of fiscal 2022 (May–July 2021), "over 80%" of the Ampere-generation GeForce GPUs shipped in the quarter were LHR products.

CMP sold, too. CMP revenue for fiscal 2022 (the year ended January 2022) was "$550 million," and had been "nominal" the year before, the fiscal 2022 10-K says.

The limits, however, were broken. In the 10-Q for the second quarter of fiscal 2023, filed on August 31, 2022, NVIDIA wrote:

"Attempts in the aftermarket to improve the hash rate capabilities of our LHR cards have been successful and our gaming cards may become more attractive to miners."

What brought GPU mining on Ethereum to an end was a change to Ethereum's own design.

On September 15, 2022, Ethereum carried out an upgrade called "The Merge," moving its consensus mechanism from "proof-of-work (PoW)" to "proof-of-stake (PoS)." According to ethereum.org, this cut Ethereum's energy consumption by about 99.95%. The Ethereum Foundation had announced in advance that after the Merge, mining would no longer be possible on the network.

In the 10-Q for the third quarter of fiscal 2023, filed on November 18, 2022, NVIDIA noted:

"With the Ethereum 2.0 merge, NVIDIA Ampere and Ada Lovelace architectures no longer include LHR."

The numbers in the same 10-Q were harsh. CMP revenue was "nominal" in this quarter as in the one before, and Gaming revenue was down 51% from a year earlier. As reasons for the drop in Gaming, the company cited lower sell-in to partners to align channel inventory with demand expectations, and macroeconomic headwinds and lockdowns in China weighing on consumer demand. It did not put a figure on the impact of the Merge. Inventory charges of $702 million were recorded for the quarter, and $2.01 billion for the first nine months; the 10-Q attributed the quarter's $702 million largely to lower Data Center demand in China.

On November 30, 2022, 12 days after that 10-Q was filed, OpenAI released the conversational AI "ChatGPT." It was the lab to which, six summers earlier, Huang had delivered the first DGX-1 in person.

In the fiscal year ended January 2023, which straddled ChatGPT's release, NVIDIA's Data Center revenue was $15.005 billion, surpassing Gaming's $9.067 billion for the first time. From here, the center of gravity of NVIDIA's revenue began moving to the data center.

(Continued in Part 4: "The Five-Trillion-Dollar Factory and the 'Invisible Moat'")

References