On August 26, 2022, a single notice reached NVIDIA from the U.S. government.

It said that any future export to China (including Hong Kong) and Russia of the A100, a GPU for data centers, of the H100, a next-generation chip that had yet to ship, and of DGX and other systems built with them would require a license, effective immediately.

The reason the U.S. government gave was to address the risk that these products might be used in, or diverted to, a "military end use" or "military end user" in China and Russia.

Five days later, on August 31, NVIDIA filed a current report on Form 8-K with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), writing that the third-quarter outlook it had given on August 24 included "approximately $400 million in potential sales to China" that could fall under the new license requirement. An 8-K the next day, September 1, also disclosed that some authorizations had been granted, covering among other things the continued development of the H100 and support for U.S. customers of the A100.

On October 7, the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) put into effect new export control rules covering advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing equipment (they were published in the Federal Register on October 13). In a later quarterly report, NVIDIA looked back on the August 2022 measures as export restrictions and licensing requirements targeting China's semiconductor and supercomputing industries.

This is how the products of a company that began with 3D graphics for PC games came to be named in national security documents.

For the four-plus years that followed, a chase played out among Washington, which kept rewriting its rules; NVIDIA, which kept preparing new products that needed no license; and Beijing, which took measures of its own.


The A800, the H800 and "$5.5 billion"

In its February 2023 annual report on Form 10-K, NVIDIA wrote that it was offering customers in China alternative products not subject to the new license requirements, such as its new A800.

A year later, on October 17, 2023, the U.S. government announced amendments to the rules.

According to NVIDIA's 8-K filed the same day, the license requirement now covered, in addition to the A100 and H100, the A800, the H800, the L40, the L40S and the RTX 4090. Future products would also be covered depending on their "total processing performance" (TPP) and "performance density." The covered territory, too, was widened beyond China to groups of countries that include Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam, among others.

In its explanation of the rule in the Federal Register, BIS wrote that it was adding the performance density parameter to prevent "technical workarounds." The parameter, it explained, was meant to close off the workaround of buying a larger number of smaller data center AI chips and combining them to match the power of restricted chips.

The amended rule was originally to take effect after a 30-day period.

Six days later, however, on October 23, the U.S. government told NVIDIA that for products with a TPP of 4800 or more that were designed or marketed for data centers, the license requirement was effective immediately. The shipments affected were those of the A100, A800, H100, H800 and L40S.

At the time, NVIDIA wrote in an 8-K that, given the strength of demand for its products worldwide, it "does not anticipate that the accelerated timing of the licensing requirements will have a near-term meaningful impact on its financial results."

For China, there was also the H20, a data center GPU. In a later earnings release, NVIDIA described H20 products as "designed primarily for the China market."

Washington's rules kept spreading after that.

On January 13, 2025, the U.S. government under the outgoing Biden administration announced an interim final rule known as the "AI Diffusion" rule (it was published in the Federal Register on January 15). According to NVIDIA's 8-K, the rule would, unless modified, impose a worldwide license requirement on exports of the A100, H100, H200, B200, GB200 and other products after a 120-day delayed compliance period. The rule also built in a system of per-country limits ("country caps").

In the same 8-K, NVIDIA wrote that it would provide feedback on the rule during the comment period. Then, on May 13, 2025, just ahead of May 15, the date on which compliance was to begin, the Commerce Department under the new administration announced that it was rescinding the rule.

On April 9, 2025, a little more than a month before the rescission was announced, the license requirement had already been extended to the H20.

That day, the U.S. government told NVIDIA that exporting the H20, and products with memory bandwidth or interconnect bandwidth equivalent to the H20's, to China (including Hong Kong and Macau) and other destinations would require a license. The reason given was the risk that the products might be used in, or diverted to, a supercomputer in China.

On April 14, NVIDIA was told that the license requirement would be in effect "for the indefinite future."

In an 8-K the next day, April 15, NVIDIA disclosed that its results for the first quarter (ending April 27, 2025) were expected to include "up to approximately $5.5 billion" of charges associated with H20 products for inventory, purchase commitments and related reserves. AMD, too, disclosed in an 8-K filed on April 16 that the new license requirement applied to its MI308 products and could result in charges of up to approximately $800 million in inventory, purchase commitments and related reserves.

In the actual results, announced on May 28, the charge for excess inventory and purchase obligations, as demand for the H20 diminished, came to $4.5 billion. H20 sales before the license requirement took effect were $4.6 billion, and there was a further $2.5 billion of H20 revenue that NVIDIA was unable to ship in the quarter.

In the following second quarter (ending July 27, 2025), there were no H20 sales to China-based customers. About $650 million in unrestricted H20 sales to a customer outside China allowed NVIDIA to release $180 million of previously reserved inventory.


Questions about vulnerabilities, and the twist of a 25% tariff

From August 2025, matters took a twist in another direction. The story is set out in the quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the second quarter of fiscal 2027, filed on August 26, 2026.

According to the 10-Q, beginning in August 2025 the U.S. government granted licenses that would have allowed NVIDIA to ship certain H20 products to certain China-based customers. But those sales were restricted by the Chinese government, and NVIDIA was unable to sell its H20 inventory.

The 10-Q also says that, following U.S. legislative proposals calling for mandatory features in chips, China's government publicly questioned whether the H20 had "built-in vulnerabilities," discouraging customers from buying. NVIDIA says it issued a public response explaining that "our GPUs, including H20, do not include such built-in vulnerabilities."

The same thing happened with the higher-end H200.

Beginning in February 2026, the U.S. government granted licenses to ship small amounts of H200 products to specific China-based customers. These sales, too, were restricted by the Chinese government, and NVIDIA has been unable to sell all the products for which it has licenses. In the first half of fiscal 2027, it recorded a $400 million charge for excess inventory and purchase obligations as demand for the H200 diminished.

What it was able to ship after that was a fraction of the allowed amount, accounting for "less than 1%" of Data Center revenue in the most recent quarter.

On the conditions attached to the licenses, the 10-Q says this:

"The licenses require that the H200s go through an inspection process in the United States prior to any shipment to the customer. As a result, any H200s shipped under the new licensing program are subject to a 25% tariff upon importation into the United States. We have been unable to pass along any of the tariff to our customers, and do not anticipate doing so in the event we are able to sell licensed products into the China market."

Chips to be sold to China are first brought into the United States for inspection, that import is subject to a 25% tariff, and NVIDIA bears the cost. Even so, on the Chinese side, sales are restricted.

The same 10-Q describes the situation as of the end of the second quarter of fiscal 2027 as follows:

"While we were able to ship uncontrolled products to China, such as gaming and workstation GPUs, we were effectively foreclosed from competing in China's data center computing/compute market, and our effective foreclosure from the China market helped our competitors build larger developer and customer ecosystems to challenge us worldwide."

In the earnings releases of February 2026 (the fourth quarter of fiscal 2026), May (the first quarter of fiscal 2027) and August (the second quarter), the outlook for the following quarter carried the same sentence all three times:

"NVIDIA is not assuming any Data Center compute revenue from China in its outlook."


The seven conditions attached to a 2020 approval

On the Chinese side, too, there was a document that bound NVIDIA.

On April 16, 2020, China's antitrust regulator, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), issued an announcement approving NVIDIA's acquisition of Mellanox with conditions attached. This was the deal in which NVIDIA bought Mellanox, a maker of high-speed networking equipment, for about $7.0 billion. According to NVIDIA's 8-K, with this the deal had antitrust approval from the European Commission, Mexico and China.

The announcement found that the acquisition "has or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition" in the global and Chinese markets for GPU accelerators, dedicated networking equipment and high-speed Ethernet adapters. In that analysis, the announcement put NVIDIA's share of the GPU accelerator market at 90–95% worldwide and 95–100% in China.

SAMR then attached seven conditions to its approval (items 6 and 7 are withheld as "confidential information"). The five conditions made public are as follows:

  1. When selling NVIDIA GPU accelerators and Mellanox high-speed networking equipment in the Chinese market, not to force tying in any form, not to attach unreasonable trading conditions, not to obstruct customers from buying the products separately, and not to discriminate against customers who buy them separately in service levels, prices or software functions
  2. To continue supplying GPU accelerators, high-speed networking equipment, and related software and components to the Chinese market on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory principles
  3. To continue to maintain interoperability between NVIDIA GPU accelerators and other companies' networking equipment, and between Mellanox networking equipment and other companies' accelerators
  4. To keep the commitment to continue open-sourcing the point-to-point communication software and collective communication software for Mellanox high-speed networking equipment
  5. To protect the information of other manufacturers of accelerators and networking equipment

Six years after the conditions took effect, an application could be made to lift them, and until they were lifted they had to be observed. Because the announcement took effect on the day it was issued, an application can be made from April 2026 onward.

More than four and a half years later, on December 9, 2024, SAMR issued a short announcement.

"Recently, because NVIDIA is suspected of violating the 'Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China' and the 'Announcement of the State Administration for Market Regulation on the Anti-Monopoly Review Decision Approving, with Conditions Attached, the Case of NVIDIA's Acquisition of Equity in Mellanox' (SAMR Announcement [2020] No. 16), the State Administration for Market Regulation has, in accordance with the law, opened a case and launched an investigation into NVIDIA."

Nine months later, on September 15, 2025, came the next announcement.

"Recently, a preliminary investigation found that NVIDIA had violated the 'Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China' and the 'Announcement of the State Administration for Market Regulation on the Anti-Monopoly Review Decision Approving, with Conditions Attached, the Case of NVIDIA's Acquisition of Equity in Mellanox.' The State Administration for Market Regulation has, in accordance with the law, decided to conduct a further investigation."

SAMR's announcements do not say which conditions were violated, or how.

NVIDIA's own account is in its February 2026 10-K. According to the 10-K, regulators in China had inquired about NVIDIA's sales and efforts to supply the China market and about its fulfillment of the commitments it entered into at the close of the Mellanox acquisition. The 10-K then describes the substance of the preliminary finding published on September 15, 2025, as follows:

"Our compliance with applicable U.S. export controls, which required us to offer degraded products to the Chinese market, discriminated unfairly against customers in the China market and therefore violated the terms of China's approval of our Mellanox acquisition."

This is NVIDIA's own summary, in its own filing, of the regulator's finding: an account in which having followed U.S. rules was deemed to breach the conditions of China's approval. The 10-K also says that if regulators conclude that NVIDIA has failed to fulfill the conditions or has violated Chinese law, it could be subject to financial penalties, restrictions on its business, orders regarding its networking business, and other measures.

As of November 2026, no announcement of a final decision by SAMR could be found.

Antitrust interest is not limited to China. The same 10-K says that France's competition authority collected information from NVIDIA about its business and competition as part of an ongoing inquiry into competition in the markets for graphics cards and cloud service providers. It adds that NVIDIA has received, and continues to receive, broad requests for information from competition regulators in the EU, the United States, the United Kingdom, China and South Korea, regarding its sales of GPUs and other products, its efforts to allocate supply, and other matters.


Singapore's "$23.6 billion" and a change in how revenue is counted

During this period of spreading export controls, the geographic revenue figures in NVIDIA's annual reports show a number that stands out.

In the 10-K for fiscal 2025 (ended January 2025), filed in February 2025, revenue by geographic region based on customer billing location shows China (including Hong Kong) at $17.108 billion. A larger amount, $23.684 billion, is booked to Singapore. That is 18% of total revenue of $130.497 billion. Singapore's figure was $6.831 billion the year before, and $2.288 billion the year before that.

The same 10-K attaches a note to this figure.

"Customers use Singapore to centralize invoicing while our products are almost always shipped elsewhere. Shipments to Singapore were less than 2% of fiscal year 2025 total revenue."

The 10-K also says that revenue by geographic area is based on the customer's billing location, and that the end customer and shipping location may differ from the billing location. Singapore's $23.6 billion is a figure that shows where invoicing was handled, not where the products were delivered.

In its fiscal 2026 10-K, filed a year later in February 2026, NVIDIA changed how it counts geographic revenue, from the customer's billing location to the location of the direct customer's headquarters. The change applied from the third quarter of fiscal 2026, and the 10-K explains that it was made "as we believe it provides a better representation of the geographic profile of our revenue." Figures for prior years were also recast on the new basis.

On the new basis, revenue from China (including Hong Kong) for fiscal 2025 becomes $25.048 billion, about $7.9 billion more than the $17.108 billion counted by billing location. China revenue for fiscal 2026, counted by headquarters, was $19.677 billion. The new table has no row for Singapore.

The 10-K cautions that, under the new basis too, the end customer and shipping location may differ from the location of the direct customer's headquarters. This means that the same revenue for the same year looked about $7.9 billion different on China's line, simply because of a change in how it was counted.


The October 2025 article

On October 9, 2025, the U.S. newspaper The New York Times (NYT) published an article about Megaspeed (Megaspeed International Pte Ltd), a Singapore data center company (by Ana Swanson and colleagues).

Citing more than six sources, including current and former officials and other people familiar with the companies, the article reported that Commerce Department officials were investigating whether Megaspeed was helping companies in China sidestep U.S. export restrictions. The sources spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss an examination that was not public. According to the article, the inquiry was active. The same article also reported that the Singapore police had told the NYT in a statement that they were investigating the company for breaching local laws (the police did not elaborate).

Singapore's Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) later laid out what that investigation involved, in a statement on November 12, 2026.

According to the statement, in February 2025 the Singapore Police Force and Singapore Customs began an independent investigation into several companies, including Megaspeed, and their key officers. The suspected offenses were domestic ones, such as potential false declarations in relation to the purchase of servers, and the investigation was not based on a request from any country, the statement says. The servers had been exported to Malaysia without entering the Singapore market, and the police were investigating whether they had subsequently been routed from Malaysia to another destination, contrary to the declarations made in Singapore.

On June 24, 2025, the U.S. Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) conducted a voluntary post-shipment verification check at Megaspeed. According to the statement, that was the first time Singapore came to know of U.S. interest. The investigation into Megaspeed and six other individuals is still ongoing, the statement says.

Megaspeed's chief executive officer (CEO), James Tan Yong Pong, said in a statement on November 12, 2026, that "Megaspeed takes its compliance obligations under U.S. export control laws extremely seriously," adding that the company had cooperated with BIS inspections (according to CNN).

The October 2025 NYT article opened with a scene from one night.

On a humid night in June 2024, the article writes, Jensen Huang was holding court with people from several of NVIDIA's major Asian customers at a bar with sweeping views of Taipei. They stood and toasted the booming AI industry. According to the article, the person next to him at that moment was a woman who was an executive at Megaspeed: Alice Huang (Huang Le).

According to the article, Megaspeed was poised to buy $2 billion of NVIDIA AI technology over the following year. Alice Huang and Jensen Huang are not related.

According to the Ministry of Home Affairs statement, Alice Huang, a Hong Kong resident, became a subject of the Singapore investigation because she was at the time Megaspeed's CEO and chairperson and one of its key controllers. The statement says explicitly that she "was not investigated for espionage." On June 24, 2025, the day of the BIS check, the police interviewed her. Because she was not based in Singapore, the police impounded her passport to secure her attendance for the investigation.

In February 2026, in consultation with the prosecuting authorities, the police concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish that Alice Huang had committed any offenses relating to the possible inaccurate declarations for which Megaspeed was being investigated. The police did, however, assess that in the course of the investigation she had provided information she knew to be inaccurate, to downplay her role in Megaspeed, and they issued her a stern warning and barred her from re-entering the country. Her passport was returned on February 26, 2026, and she left Singapore the same day.

What the October 2025 article reported was that the U.S. Commerce Department and the Singapore police were each investigating one company.

A little more than a year later, on October 29, 2026, the name Alice Huang appeared again, in a different article in the same NYT.

(Continued in Part 6: "November 2026")

References